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Abstract
This paper extends the calibrations of Piketty and Saez (2013) to unveil the
importance of the assumed social welfare criteria and its interplay with individual
heterogeneity on optimal inheritance taxation. I calibrate the full social optimal
tax rate and find that it is highly sensitive to the assumed social welfare criteria.
The optimal tax rate ranges from negative (under a utilitarian criterion) to positive
and large (even assuming joy of giving motives). A decreasing marginal utility of
consumption does not affect the results qualitatively given the underlying distri-
bution of wealth and income. I also calibrate the optimal tax rate by percentile
of the distribution of bequest received, as in Piketty and Saez, but accounting for
heterogeneity in wealth and labor income. This leads to significant variation in
the optimal tax rate among zero-bequest receivers, contrary to their finding of a
constant tax rate.
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1 Introduction
Taxation of wealth is currently at the center of many academic and political debates.
For the case of inheritance taxation, policy makers are discussing reforms across many
European countries, and in the U.S. the estate tax has been modified almost every year
since 2001, currently operating with a 40% top marginal rate. This paper presents a
positive analysis of two crucial features that underlie the design of optimal inheritance
taxation, namely the assumed preference for redistribution (the social welfare function
—SWF—) and the large variation across individuals regarding their preferred optimal tax
rate (the underlying individual heterogeneity).
Most studies on inheritance taxation assume a utilitarian SWF. While this is a standard
approach in the literature of optimal taxation, it has important consequences, as noted
by Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2018) for the case of labor income taxation. I show that
inheritance taxation is particularly affected by this assumption due to the interaction
between the positive externalities that can arise from joy of giving bequest motives and
the high concentration of bequests at the top of the distribution.
The model derived by Piketty and Saez (2013) —henceforth PS13— allows for different
SWFs, which can be used to calibrate the optimal tax rate under different social welfare
criteria. However, they opt for calibrating the optimal tax rate from the perspective of
each percentile of the distribution of bequest received rather than the full social optimum
under standard social welfare criteria. While their approach is informative of the role of
heterogeneity in bequests received on inheritance taxation, it does not result in a single
tax rate applicable to the entire population, and it does not fully capture heterogeneity in
wealth and labor income.
This paper presents two contributions. First, I show that different assumptions on
the SWF lead to very different full social optimal tax rates due to the high concentration
of bequests at the top of the distribution and the existence of positive externalities. To
do so, I revisit the model of PS13 and calibrate their optimal tax formula for the U.S.
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under three different standard social welfare criteria.1 I obtain that under a utilitarian
criterion the optimal tax rate is always negative, even with fully accidental bequests.
Under the responsibility and compensation criterion, the optimal tax rate is positive and
very sensitive to other parameters of the model, particularly to the bequest elasticity.
Under a Rawlsian criterion the optimal tax rate is positive and large, solely limited by the
bequest elasticity. Interestingly, the concavity of the individual utility function does not
have a qualitatively important impact on the optimal tax rate, due to offsetting effects
from the underlying distribution of wealth and labor income and the trade-off between
bequest and labor taxes.
Second, I extend the calibration by percentile of the distribution of bequest received
to include heterogeneity in wealth and labor income. I find that the optimal tax rate for
those who do not receive any bequests (70% of the population) varies significantly, from
an 83.3% tax rate for the worst-off individuals to negative tax rates for those who, despite
not having received any bequest, have accumulated wealth through high labor income.
This result differs from the one obtained by PS13, in which the tax rate remains fairly
constant around 50% for all zero-bequest receivers.
Altogether, these results show that the optimal inheritance tax rate depends heavily
on the assumed SWF and the underlying distribution of bequests, income, and wealth.
These two findings are crucial for the design of optimal inheritance taxes. Policy makers
must account for the effect of different SWFs and the utilitarian framework is not a
neutral benchmark. The percentile calibrations show a large variation on the optimal tax
rate from the individual point of view. This helps to explain the public debate around
inheritance taxation given the large heterogeneity in individual preferences and highlights
its dependence on the social planner’s welfare function.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the literature on inheritance
taxation with a focus on the assumed bequest motives and social welfare criteria. Section
3 summarizes the model of Piketty and Saez (2013). Section 4 presents the results from
calibrating the full social optimal tax rate under standard social welfare criteria. Section
1 PS13 (p.15 of supplementary material) write: “It would be interesting to use our estimates to
compute the full social optimum implied by various SWFs ...”
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5 presents the results from calibrating the optimal tax by percentiles accounting for
heterogeneity in wealth and labor income. Section 6 concludes.
2 Review of the literature
The study of optimal inheritance taxation needs to account for two relevant features of
inheritance taxation. This section presents an overview of how they have been addressed
in the literature. The first feature is the bequest motive, that is, the motivation for the
donor to leave a bequest. With altruistic motives, donors care about the lifetime utility of
their heirs and therefore internalize the effects of bequests on the donees. Under joy of
giving motives, the donors’ utility function depends on the after-tax bequest left, but not
on the utility of the donees, which can lead to a positive externality because donors do
not internalize the effect of their actions on the donees.2 Finally, accidental motives lead
to unplanned bequests and in this case the tax rate has no effect on the donors’ utility.3
A second crucial feature for the study of optimal inheritance taxation is the assumption
imposed on how individual utilities are weighted in the SWF. Frequently a utilitarian cri-
terion is assumed. This turns out to be particularly relevant due to the high concentration
of bequests at the top of the distribution and the presence of externalities of giving that
increase proportionally with the amount bequeathed. Hence, even small variations in the
social weights of individuals at the top of the distribution can cause significant changes in
the optimal tax.
These two features are unremarked in the most prominent results of the literature. For
example, the model of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) has been extrapolated to the study of
inheritance taxation reinterpreting consumption of different commodities as consumption
at different points in time, and taxation of future consumption as a tax on bequests, which
should therefore be zero. This model implicitly assumes joy of giving bequest motives
because it is the bequests left, and not the utility of the heirs, that enters the utility of
the first generation. The social planner of this model maximizes a utilitarian SWF.
2 This ‘externality of giving’ differs from a standard atmospheric externality because it is interpersonal,
requiring differentiated Pigouvian taxes.
3 Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) estimate that over 30% of bequests are accidental.
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Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) study capital taxation using an infinite-life model,
measuring social welfare from the first generation. They assume altruistic bequest motives
and since it is a representative agent model, the implicit SWF is utilitarian. They conclude
that the optimal tax rate is zero, however Straub and Werning (2020) have overturned
this result, obtaining a positive tax rate.
Farhi and Werning (2010) extend the model of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) to explicitly
model inheritance taxation considering two generations. The first generation of donors have
joy of giving motives and starts with no wealth inequality but heterogeneous productivity,
so that the inheritance received by the second generation and labor inequality are perfectly
correlated. The second generation only consumes what they inherited and do not work. If
the social planner (with a utilitarian SWF) only considers the utility of the first generation,
the optimal tax rate is zero. However, when the utility of the second generation is included
in the social welfare the optimal inheritance tax rate becomes negative to correct for the
positive externality caused by joy of giving motives.
Cremer and Pestieau (2011) use an overlaping generations model based on Diamond
(1965) and extend it to model inheritances, showing how the optimal inheritance tax
rate depends on the bequest motives. If bequests are fully accidental, a tax rate of 100%
is optimal. If bequest motives are altruistic, the utility function of the representative
individual fully captures the utility of next generations internalizing the positive externality
of giving. In this case, the optimal tax rate in the long run is zero. With joy of giving
motives, the positive externality appears and the optimal tax rate is negative. Note,
however, that in all these cases the SWF is utilitarian.
Brunner and Pech (2012a) and Brunner and Pech (2012b) improve upon previous
models by including initial wealth inequality. They find that the optimal tax can increase
social welfare if initial wealth and earning abilities are correlated. They consider altruistic
and joy of giving motives, but control for double-counting of utilities between generations.
They assume that the SWF puts more weight on low ability individuals to ensure a
preference for redistribution but the implications of this assumption are not further
explored.
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Recent contributions to the literature of inheritance taxation emphasize the labor
supply response of inheritors. Kopczuk (2013) finds that an increase on bequests will
reduce total labor supply and revenue from labor income taxes, generating a negative ‘fiscal
externality’ that can be counteracted with a tax on bequests. In this line, Kindermann
et al. (2018) further develop and calibrate a life-cycle model that accounts for the labor
supply of heirs and find sizable ‘fiscal externalities’. Both models assume joy of giving
motives and utilitarian SWF.4
Closely related to this paper is the model of Farhi and Werning (2013), which introduces
heterogeneity in altruistic motives and also considers different SWFs. They find that
“optimal estate taxes depend crucially on redistributive objectives. Different welfare criteria
lead to results ranging from taxes to subsidies” (p.490). Their results therefore constitute
a theoretical basis for the empirical calibrations that I present here, based on the model
of PS13.
3 The model of Piketty and Saez
The model of PS13 contributes to the literature allowing for alternative SWFs and for a
combination of bequest motives. The authors present a dynamic stochastic model with
a discrete set of generations that do not overlap, with heterogeneous bequest tastes and
labor productivities. There is labor augmenting economic growth at rate G > 1 per
generation. The government has a given budgetary need E that is financed with linear
taxes on labor income at rate τLt and on capitalized bequest at rate τBt. This revenue is
then equally distributed across individuals as a lump-sum grant per individual, Et.
Each individual, ti, lives in generation t and belongs to dynasty i. Each receives a
pre-tax bequest bti that earns an exogenous gross rate of return R and at death leaves a
pre-tax bequest bt+1i to the next generation. There is an unequal initial distribution of
bequests b0 given exogenously. Each individual works lti hours at a pre-tax wage rate wti
drawn from an arbitrary but stationary distribution, earning yLti = wtilti.
Individuals have a utility function V ti(cti, b, b, lti), increasing in consumption cti, in
4 Elinder et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence on such labor supply responses to inheritances.
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pre-tax bequest left b (capturing accidental motives), and in after-tax capitalized bequest
left b = R · bt+1i(1− τBt+1) (capturing joy of giving motives5) and decreasing in labor lti.
Note that the donor’s utility function includes the after-tax capitalized bequest left but
not the utility of the bequest receivers, resulting in a positive externality. Individuals use
their net-of-taxes lifetime resources on consumption cti and bequest left bt+1i. Hence, the
individual maximization problem is
max
lti, cti, bt+1i≥0
V ti(cti, b, b, lti) s.t. (1)
cti + bt+1i = Rbti(1− τBt) + wtilti(1− τLt) + Et
The utility functions V ti and the wage rates wti are assumed to follow an ergodic
stochastic process such that with constant tax rates τB and τL, and government revenue
E, the economy converges to a unique ergodic steady-state equilibrium independent of the
initial distribution of bequests b0i. In equilibrium individuals maximize utility as in (1)
and this results in a steady-state ergodic equilibrium distribution of bequests and earning
(bti, yLti).
The steady-state SWF is defined as the sum of individual utilities weighted by Pareto
weights ωti ≥ 0. Hence, a normative social welfare criterion must be assumed. The
government must solve
SWF = max
τL,τB
∫
i
ωtiV
ti(cti, b, b, lti) s.t. (2)
E = RbtτB + wtltτL
The derivation of the optimal tax rate on bequests τB takes the linear marginal tax
on labor income τL as given. In the steady-state equilibrium the government’s financial
needs E will be constant (dE = 0) and with no government debt, the two taxes, τB and
τL, will be linked to each other in order to satisfy the government’s budget constrain. The
5 PS13 denote these bequests as altruistic (as opposed to accidental), however it corresponds to joy of
giving motives as defined above.
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optimal linear tax on bequests that maximizes steady-state social welfare is
τB =
1−
[
1− eLτL1− τL
]
·
[
b¯received
y¯L
(1 + eˆB) +
ν
R/G
b¯left
y¯L
]
1 + eB −
[
1− eLτL1− τL
]
b¯received
y¯L
(1 + eˆB)
(3)
where ν is the share of joy of giving bequests and eB and eL are the long-run elasticities
that capture behavioral responses of bequest flows bt and of the aggregated labor supply
in terms of earning yLt with respect to the corresponding net-of-tax rates (1− τB) and
(1− τL). Because the two taxes, τB and τL, are linked to satisfy the government budget
constraint, the elasticities capture the effect of a joint and budget-neutral change in both
taxes. The elasticities are defined as
eB =
1− τB
bt
dbt
d(1− τB)
∣∣∣∣∣
E
and eL =
1− τL
yLt
dyLt
d(1− τL)
∣∣∣∣∣
E
(4)
The distributional parameters b¯received, b¯left and y¯L capture two elements. First, the
degree of inequality of bequests received, bequests left, and labor income observed in the
data. And second, the normative weighting of the individuals in the SWF.
b¯received =
∫
i gtibti
bt
, b¯left =
∫
i gtibt+1i
bt+1
and y¯L =
∫
i gtiyLti
yLt
(5)
The three parameters are defined as the ratios of the population average weighted by
the social welfare weights gti (defined below) to the unweighted population averages. The
ratios will be smaller than 1 if the social welfare weights gti put more weight on individuals
that are worse-off and will be equal to 1 when these weights are equally distributed.
The social welfare weights gti (Saez and Stantcheva, 2016) are defined as each individ-
ual’s marginal utility of consumption, V tic , weighted by the Pareto weight ωti and divided
by the weighted average of the marginal utility of consumption for the entire population
to normalize them. They measure the social value of increasing consumption of individual
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ti by one unit relative to distributing that unit equally across all individuals.
gti =
ωtiV
ti
c∫
j ωtjV
tj
c
(6)
Calibration
The strategy followed by PS13 for the calibration of the optimal tax rate is to calibrate it
for each percentile of the distribution of bequest received. In other words, they sequentially
calibrate the optimal tax from the perspective of each 1% interval of the distribution of
bequest received, as if the social planner only cared for those individuals. In terms of the
social welfare weights, gti, their approach is equivalent to recursively setting the weights
of all individuals to zero except for those belonging to percentile p.6,7
Using U.S. micro-data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 2010 and focusing
on individuals aged 70+, PS13 obtain the optimal tax rate by percentile of bequest received,
which is shown in figure 1a along with my own replication.8 The figure reports the optimal
linear tax rate τB from the point of view of each percentile of bequest receivers based on
(3) and given the benchmark parameters eb = 0.2, eL = 0.2, τL = 30%, ν = 1, R/G = 1.8
and a capitalization rate r = 3. We observe that the optimal tax rate remains constant
around 50% until percentile 70, corresponding to individuals who have not received any
bequest. It then drops rapidly as the inheritance received, and to a lesser extent wealth
and income, increase. For percentiles above 85 the optimal tax turns negative (a subsidy),
growing to minus infinity. Note that the figure is constructed with a lower bound of −20%.
In figure 1b I show the three distributional parameters b¯receivedp , b¯leftp , and y¯Lp that
underlie my replication of the optimal tax rate. We observe that they remain fairly
constant until percentile 70, causing the constant 50% optimal tax rate for the first 70
percentiles. In Section 5, I account for heterogeneity in wealth and labor income, obtaining
a different result.
6 In their own words: “To be agnostic and explore heterogeneity in optimal τB across the distribution,
we consider percentile p-weights which concentrate uniformly the weights gti on percentile p of the
distribution of bequest received.” (PS13, p.1873).
7 PS13 also calibrate the optimal tax rate for larger groups of de distribution of bequest received
(0-50, 50-70, 70-90 and 90-95).
8 Note that the replication for the first 70 percentiles cannot be exact because individuals are randomly
assigned to each percentile, as discussed in Section 5.
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Figure 1: Replication of the optimal tax rate by percentile of bequest received and
distributional parameters.
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4 Calibration of the Full Social Optimum
This section shows the results from calibrating the full social optimal tax rate under
three standard social welfare criteria. First, the utilitarian criterion, which corresponds
to a social planer with no preference for redistribution that weights individuals equally
in the SWF, with ωti equally distributed. Second, the responsibility and compensation
criterion, which sets ωti to 1 for individuals who did not receive any bequests, and to zero
for those who did, arguing that this source of inequality is unmerited. And third, the
Rawlsian criterion, which has the strongest preference for redistribution, considering only
the worst-off individual in the SWF, and setting ωti to zero for all individuals except for
the individual with the lowest utility.9
The individual utility V ti enters the social welfare weights gti through the individual
marginal utility of consumption V tic . I consider a utility function that is additively
separable in consumption cti, i.e. V ti(cti, b, b, lti) = u(cti) + hti(b, b, lti). First, I consider
u(cti) being linear and hence a marginal utility V tic = α.10 Second, I consider u(cti) being
isoelastic, with V tic = c
−ρ
ti which is strictly concave for ρ > 0. I evaluate this function for a
range of values of ρ between 0 and 1.4 based on the estimates of Chetty (2006).
The social welfare weights gti resulting from the different combinations of the three
social welfare criteria and the different utility functions are shown in the appendix (figure
A1).11 These welfare weights are then used to compute the distributional parameters of
bequest received, bequest left, and labor income, defined in (5), which determine the full
social optimal tax rate defined in (3).
Utilitarian
Table 1 presents the resulting full social optimal tax rates. The first panel shows the
results under the utilitarian criterion and different levels of concavity of the individual utility
function. Under the utilitarian criterion, the pareto weights ωti are equally distributed for
9 PS13 calibrate the optimal tax rate under a “meritocratic Rawlsian” criterion, which is equivalent
to the responsibility and compensation criterion but setting the welfare weights to zero for about half the
population.
10 In this case, the marginal utility of bequest left must be non-constant to obtain an interior solution.
11 Note that under a Rawlsian criterion, the welfare weights are the same for all specifications of
individual utilities, since only one individual has positive weight.
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all individuals and the welfare weights gti are only unequally distributed when the utility
function is strictly concave. I obtain that under the utilitarian criterion the optimal tax
rate is negative irrespective of the concavity of the functional form.
This negative-tax result is caused by the positive externality that originates in the joy
of giving motive. Note that V ti(cti, b, b, lti) increases with the after-tax bequest left b, that
is, the utility of the donors increases due to the act of bequeathing alone, regardless of
its positive effect on the utility of the donees. In a steady-state equilibrium with a social
planner that cares about the utility of all generations, this produces a positive externality
and the optimal tax rate internalizes it by means of a negative tax.
Importantly, the negative-tax result hinges also on the assumption of a utilitarian SWF.
The reason is that the positive externality grows proportionally with bequest received and
the latter is highly concentrated at the top of the distribution, leading to very large positive
externalities for individuals who receive the largest bequests. Because all individuals are
weighted equally by the utilitarian criterion, the positive externality present at the top
of the distribution dominates the full social optimum. Therefore, when the full social
optimum derived by PS13 is calibrated under a utilitarian criterion it reaches the same
result as previous models who derived the optimal tax rate under joy of giving motives
and a utilitarian criterion (Farhi and Werning, 2010).12
The result that the tax rate becomes more negative as the utility function becomes
more concave might be counter-intuitive at first sight. If we increase the welfare weights
of the poor, shouldn’t the bequest subsidy decrease? However, the government’s margin
of decision is to trade off tax rates on labor income and on inheritances, conditional on
raising the revenue Et. Therefore, individuals with high marginal utility of consumption
(who are the ones with less income)13 will be weighted more by the government and these
12Note that strictly speaking, under a utilitarian criterion with linear individual utility the first best
solution would be to use a lump-sum tax rather than a distortive labor income tax to finance the bequest
subsidy . In this case, however, the lump-sum grant would not be optimal. We must hence assume that in
a second-best world even a government with equal welfare weights is forced to use labor income taxation
to collect a given amount E.
13In the absence of consumption data, I use labor income as a proxy for consumption. An alternative
would be to construct a measure of overall budget combining lifetime income and wealth. Both measures,
however, are likely to incur in some measurement error that will be concentrated at the top and bottom
percentiles of the distribution.
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individuals prefer a high rate on labor rather than on bequests. Crucially, this statement
hinges on the underlying distribution of income and wealth observed in the data. If we
look at the distributional parameter reported in the central columns of Table 1 we observe
that as the concavity of the utility function increases, the distributional parameter of
labor income decreases more than that of bequest received and bequest left. In other
words, the labor incomes that the government weights in its welfare function represent a
decreasing share. The distributional parameters of bequest received and bequest left also
decrease, but less so, leading to a decrease in the tax, that is, an increase in the subsidy.
Table 1: Full social optimal tax rate under different welfare criteria
Welfare
criterion
Utility b¯receivedp b¯leftp y¯Lp
Optimal
tax rate
Utilitarian
ρ = 0 (linear) 1.00 1.00 1.00 -582.3%
ρ = 0.3 0.99 0.88 0.91 -5040.1%
ρ = 0.7 0.92 0.77 0.80 -10000.0%
ρ = 1.4 0.78 0.71 0.61 -10000.0%
Resp. &
compens.
ρ = 0 (linear) 0.00 0.83 0.99 48.1%
ρ = 0.3 0.00 0.72 0.91 50.0%
ρ = 0.7 0.00 0.63 0.79 49.9%
ρ = 1.4 0.00 0.64 0.60 38.5%
Rawlsian linear = isoel. 0.00 0.00 0.23 83.3%
Note: Own calculations using SCF 2010. Lower bound -10000%.
Benchmark parameters: eb = 0.2, eL = 0.2, τL = 30%, ν = 1, R/G = 1.8.
Responsibility and compensation
Under the responsibility and compensation criterion, individuals who received a positive
bequest (around 30%) are weighted out of the SWF, and those who did not, have positive
weights either equally distributed when the utility function is linear or diminishing in
labor income when the utility function is isoelastic. Under this criterion the optimal tax
rate becomes positive and, for the linear utility case, equal to 48.1%.
The positive-tax result highlights the importance of the SWF for the optimal tax rate.
By excluding individuals from the top percentiles the externality of giving disappears and
the optimal tax rate becomes positive. This is driven by the distributional parameter of
bequest received which, by definition, drops to zero.
13
Interestingly, the concavity of the utility function impacts the optimal tax rate non-
monotonically, and this is driven by the distribution of wealth, which does not increase
monotonically with labor income (and hence with the marginal utility of consumption).
With bequest receivers weighted out of the social welfare function, the ratio between the
distributional parameters of bequest left and labor income (b¯leftp /y¯Lp) is what determines
the government’s choice of taxes on bequests and labor income. In this case, moving
from a linear utility function to a slightly concave function (ρ = 0.3) reduces that ratio,
therefore the share of wealth that the government cares about (the one weighted in its
social welfare function) decreases less than the share of labor income that the government
weights in. However, for further degrees of concavity the effect is the opposite and the
ratio increases, leading to a decrease in the optimal tax rate.
As an illustration of these forces, note that the distributional parameter of bequest
left decreases as ρ goes from 0 to 0.3 and to 0.7, but then increases when ρ = 1.4. In this
later case, the weight given to the individuals at the bottom of the income distribution
is an order of magnitude of 10 times the weight when ρ = 0.7. These individuals have a
comparatively high net wealth (see percentile 1 of figure 3a) which makes them prefer a
low or even negative tax on wealth despite not having received any bequest. This increases
the ratio b¯leftp /y¯Lp and pushes the full social optimal tax rate down.
Rawlsian
The Rawlsian criterion assigns the full Pareto weight ωti to the worst-off individual and
sets it to zero elsewhere. Since only one individual has positive weight, the specification
of this individuals’s utility function is redundant, and therefore the welfare weights gti are
identical for both the linear and the isoelastic specifications. Hence, the full social optimal
tax rate under any specification of the individual utility is the same, in this case, 83.3%.
Note that even though this worse-off individual does not receive or leave any bequest, the
optimal tax rate from his/her perspective is not 100% because with a positive bequest
elasticity bequests would drop to zero and the revenue loss would have to be compensated
with a rise in the labor income tax rate.
Overall, these empirical calibrations are consistent with the findings of Farhi and
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Werning (2013). With an utilitarian SWF they find a negative optimal tax rate.14 Under
a Rawlsian (maxmin) criterion, they obtain a positive tax rate. The responsibility and
compensation, with a more intermediate preference for redistribution, is not evaluated in
Farhi and Werning (2013) and in our calibrations it leads to a positive tax rate that is
closer to the rates observed in current legislation.
Variants of the benchmark case
Table 2 presents the full social optimal tax rate with linear utility calibrated under different
values of the benchmark parameters used in table 1.
Table 2: Variants of the full social optimum
Utilitarian Resp. & compens. Rawlsian
Benchmark -582.3% 48.1% 83.3%
eB = 0 -485.4% 57.7% 100.0%
eB = 0.3 -619.5% 44.4% 76.9%
eB = 0.7 -724.7% 33.9% 58.8%
eB = 1 -776.0% 28.8% 49.9%
eB = 3 -921.3% 14.4% 24.9%
eB = 5 -969.8% 9.6% 16.6%
eB = 30 -1047.9% 1.8% 3.1%
eL = 0.1 -1310.3% 46.4% 83.3%
eL = 0.3 -339.6% 49.7% 83.3%
eL = 0.5 -145.5% 53.0% 83.3%
ν = 0.7 -435.9% 58.7% 83.3%
ν = 0.2 -192.0% 76.3% 83.3%
ν = 0 -94.4% 83.3% 83.3%
Note: Own calculations using SCF 2010.
Benchmark parameters: eb = 0.2, eL = 0.2, τL = 30%, ν = 1, R/G = 1.8.
The first panel shows the full social optimal tax rate under different bequest elasticities,
eb.15 Estimations by Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001) find this elasticity to be around 0.2
and PS13 consider that a value of 1 is implausibly high. However some theoretical models
14In Farhi and Werning (2013) this result holds only when the utility of both parents and children is
included in the SWF, and the optimal tax rate is zero when only the utility of parents is considered. In
PS13 each generation is both a bequest leaver and receiver.
15 Note that the elasticities eb and eL are defined with respect to the net-of-tax rates (1 − τB) and
(1− τL) and therefore take positive values.
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such as Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) are derived under a setup where the elasticity of
bequests is infinite. I therefore consider higher elasticities as well.
Higher bequest elasticities reduce the optimal tax rate on bequests. Under the
utilitarian criterion the negative tax increases in absolute value. Under the responsibility
and compensation criterion and under the Rawlsian criterion the tax rate decreases with
the bequest elasticity and it converges to 0% as the elasticity increases. Note that under
the Rawlsian criterion with an elasticity eB = 0 the optimal tax rate is 100%, since the
social planner only cares about the worst-off individual and there are no efficiency costs
from taxing bequests due to the zero elasticity. However, so long as the elasticity of
bequests is larger than zero, the optimal tax is smaller than 100%.
The second panel of table 2 shows the effect on the optimal tax rate of different labor
supply elasticities to labor income taxes, eL. We observe that higher labor elasticities
increase the optimal tax rate on bequests. The intuition for this result is that the higher the
elasticity of labor supply, the larger the efficiency loss from taxing labor income. Hence, to
satisfy the government’s budget constraint for a given labor income tax rate, a higher tax
rate on bequests is needed. Under the utilitarian criterion the optimal subsidy decreases
sharply as eL increases because the large subsidy for the top bequest receivers is now more
costly to finance. Under the responsibility and compensation criterion the sensitivity of
the optimal tax rate to changes in eL is moderate, and this result holds across different
values of eB. Under the Rawlsian criterion the optimal tax rate is unaffected by changes
in eL. Actually, under this criterion the only parameter that affects the optimal tax rate
is the elasticity of bequest, as discussed above, because the distributional parameters of
bequest received and bequest left are equal to zero and the optimal tax formula (3) is
reduced to τB = 11+eB .
The third panel shows the sensitivity of the optimal tax rate to bequest motives.
As the share of accidental bequests increases (lower ν) the optimal tax rate under the
utilitarian and responsability and compensation criteria increases. This is because taxation
of accidental bequests does not impact the utility of the donors since the after-tax bequests
left b do not enter their utility function.
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Note that for the three social welfare criteria, when bequest motives are fully accidental
(ν = 0), the optimal tax rate remains under 100%. This result differs from previous
models, like Cremer and Pestieau (2011), in which fully accidental bequest motives are
taxed at a 100% rate. The reason is that the flexibility of the model of PS13 allows for the
unconventional case where bequest motives are fully accidental but the bequest elasticity
is positive. However, if the bequest elasticity is zero the optimal tax rate becomes 100%
under the three criteria.
Final remarks
From these calibrations we conclude that the main determinant of the optimal tax rate
is the assumed social welfare criterion. Positive full social optimal tax rates under PS13’s
framework appear only when wealthier individuals are weighted less in the SWF. A second
determinant of the optimal tax rate are the ratios between the distributional parameters
of bequest received or left and of labor income. These ratios capture the government’s
social preferences regarding the trade-off between labor and bequest taxes, which depends
on the welfare weights and the underlying distribution of wealth and income.
A more concave individual utility function increases the subsidy under the utilitarian
criterion because individuals with low labor income (who therefore prefer high taxes on
labor) are weighted more, since they have higher marginal utility of consumption. Under
the responsibility and compensation criterion, however, a higher concavity of the utility
function has non-monotonic effects on the optimal tax on bequests. This is because
individuals with low income can have high wealth, so the ratio between the distributional
parameters of bequest left and labor income that determine the optimal tax rate on
bequests are also non-monotonic as the concavity of the utility increases. From these
results we conclude that, conditional on the distribution of the data, the concavity of
the individual utility does not have a qualitatively significant impact on the optimal
inheritance tax rate.
Finally, we observe that criteria with an intermediate preference for redistribution, such
as responsibility and compensation, are the most sensitive to variations of the benchmark
parameters such as the elasticities of bequests and labor income and the share of accidental
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bequests.
5 Introducing heterogeneity in wealth and labor income
The calibration approach of PS13 exploits heterogeneity in bequests received, ordering
individuals by the amount of bequest received and calculating the optimal tax rate from
the perspective of each percentile. In doing so, the large share of individuals who did not
receive any bequest, about 70%, are randomly assigned to each of the first 70 percentiles.
These individuals differ in accumulated wealth (future bequests left) and in labor income,
but since they are ordered randomly, the average value of wealth and labor income becomes
approximately the same for each of the first 70 percentiles and so do the two corresponding
distributional parameters and the resulting optimal tax rate. This leads PS13 to conclude
that the optimal tax rate by percentile is constant for the first 70 percentiles (see figures
1a and 1b).
In this section, I further exploit individual heterogeneity by sub-ordering individuals
by their wealth and labor income. This avoids the random assignment of non-receivers
across the 70 first percentiles and offers a more realistic description of the different optimal
tax rates from the perspective of each percentile and about the drivers of the optimal
tax across the population of non-receivers. This leads to an optimal tax rate that varies
significantly among the non-receivers.
In a way, this approach makes each percentile more representative of the different
individuals of the population, incorporating the heterogeneity present in all the variables
of PS13’s model. Also, this calibration approach is consistent with the assumptions of
the model, which explicitly includes heterogeneous wealth and wages, and emphasizes
the connection between these variables (e.g. individuals accumulate wealth through labor
income, which is likely to be bequeathed) and between their taxes (which must fulfill the
government’s budgetary needs).
An alternative approach for ordering individuals is to use their total budget (bequest
received plus income) or their total budget extended (adding wealth). These two measures
have the advantage of capturing individual heterogeneity jointly for bequests, income
and wealth leading to a more realistic distribution of the optimal tax rate across the
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population. However, this approach makes it harder to learn about the drivers of the
optimal tax rate by percentile because individuals with a similar budget might have very
different bequests, income and wealth. The results from this alternative approach are
reported in the appendix figures A2 and A3.
The methodology followed to calculate the new distributional parameters is the same
as in PS13, that is, giving uniform social welfare weights gti to all individuals within each
percentile. The distributional parameters b¯received, b¯left and y¯L are then the average of
bequest left, bequest received, and labor income for each percentile relative to population
averages. The change with respect to PS13’s calibration is that the individuals included
in each percentile are now different, as a result of the different ordering.
Figures 2b and 2a show the optimal tax rate and the distributional parameters resulting
from sub-ordering by wealth. Compared to the original calibrations of PS13 we observe
that the optimal tax rate is not constant for the first 70 percentiles, and neither are the
distributional parameters of bequest left, which by construction increases monotonically
for the first 70 percentiles, and labor income. Now the optimal tax rate decreases for the
first 70 percentiles, as the individuals’ wealth rises. It starts with an optimal tax rate of
83.3% for the bottom 1% (coinciding with the Rawlsian full social optimum) and turns
negative, about -14%, for percentiles 66 to 70. This evolution reflects the intuitive idea
that those individuals who did not receive any inheritance but have accumulated wealth
(which they will probably bequeath) might prefer a low or even negative inheritance tax
rate. On the other hand, individuals from the bottom percentiles who own no wealth
but earn labor income prefer a tax on inheritances that collects as much as possible
(only bounded by the elasticity of bequests), since the remaining financial needs of the
government will have to be covered by a rise in labor income taxes.
The results from sub-ordering individual observations by labor income are presented in
figures 3a and 3b. In this case the distributional parameter that increases monotonically
until percentile 70 is labor income. The distributional parameter of bequest left also tends
to increase, but it oscillates more, causing the optimal tax rate to behave more erratically.
This shows that the behavior of the distributional parameter of bequest left dominates the
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(a) Optimal inheritance tax rate by percentile of bequest received sub-
ordering by wealth. Compared to PS13.
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(b) Distributional parameters by percentile of bequest received sub-ordering by
wealth.
Figure 2: Optimal tax and distributional parameters sub-ordering by wealth.
effect of the distributional parameter of labor income, as we observed when calibrating
the different full social optima.
Unlike the case where individuals were sub-ordered by bequest left, now there are no
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(a) Optimal inheritance tax rate by percentile of bequest received sub-
ordering by labor income. Compared to PS13.
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(b) Distributional parameters sub-ordering by labor income.
Figure 3: Optimal tax and distributional parameters sub-ordering by labor income.
percentiles within the first 70 that would prefer a negative inheritance tax. The reason is
again that the main driver of that result is the distributional parameter of bequest left
but its effect is now more diluted among different percentiles due to sub-ordering by labor
income. The only exemption to this is the first percentile, which has a negative tax rate
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caused by individuals who have accumulated wealth despite not earning labor income
(through prizes or reducing their reported income using capital losses). These individuals
are willing to take a very high tax on labor income as long as the tax rate on bequests is
reduced.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows the crucial role of the assumed social welfare function —SWF— and
of individual heterogeneity for the derivation of optimal inheritance tax rate, which can
range from negative to positive and large. Inheritance taxation is particularly sensitive to
the choice of SWF due to the positive externalities that arise from joy of giving motives
and how they interact with the heterogenous distribution of bequests, which are highly
concentrated at the top of the distribution.
Under a utilitarian criterion the optimal inheritance tax rate is always negative. On
the other hand, under social welfare criteria that favor redistribution the tax rate becomes
positive. For example, under the responsibility and compensation criterion, which weights
out of the SWF the 30% of individuals who received positive bequests, the optimal tax
rate is about 50%. Under this criterion, the elasticity of bequests to taxation and the
share of accidental bequests become relevant determinants of the optimal tax rate. Under
a Rawlsian criterion, the optimal tax rate rises to 83.3%, bounded only by the elasticity
of bequests to taxation. These findings match and explain the different results obtained
by previous literature, and provide an empirical illustration.
In their paper, PS13 opt for calibrating the optimal tax rate from the perspective of
each percentile of the distribution of bequest received. This approach leads the authors to
conclude that the optimal tax rate by percentile remains fairly constant for the first 70
percentiles (those who do not receive any bequests). However, extending this methodology
to also account for heterogeneity in wealth and in labor income, the optimal tax rate
obtained for the same 70 percentiles is not constant, varying from 83% for percentile 1 to
a negative tax rate of -14% for percentile 70. This new approach offers a richer description
of the heterogeneous individuals of the population, in line with the assumptions of PS13’s
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model, which considers the interrelation between bequest received, bequest left, and labor
income.
These two findings are crucial for the design of optimal inheritance taxes. Policy
makers must account for the effect of different SWFs and the utilitarian criterion is not a
neutral benchmark. Models that assume utilitarian SWF lead to inheritance subsidies,
but relatively small modifications of the SWF can lead to more realistic tax rates. In
addition, the percentile calibrations show a large variation on the optimal tax rate from
the individual point of view. This helps explain the public debate around taxation of
inheritances given the large variation in preferences that we find.
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Figure A1: Social welfare weights for each individual under different SWF and concavities
of the individual utility function. Under a Rawlsian criterion the welfare weights are
independent of the individual utility assumed. Figures are truncated at 0.005 and 200000.
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(a) Optimal inheritance tax rate by percentile of total budget. Compared
to PS13.
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(b) Distributional parameters by percentile of total budget.
Figure A2: Optimal tax and distributional parameters sub-ordering by total budget
(inheritance received + labor income).
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(a) Optimal inheritance tax rate by percentile of total budget extended.
Compared to PS13.
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(b) Distributional parameters by percentile of total budget extended.
Figure A3: Optimal tax and distributional parameters sub-ordering by total budget
extended (inheritance received + labor income + wealth).
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